



## RESEARCH PAPER

### Pakistan's Decision to Join US War on Terror and Repercussion for Pakistan

<sup>1</sup>Muhammad Abid Nazir\* <sup>2</sup>Dr. Gulshan Majeed

1. Ph. D Scholar, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan
2. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan

PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
<p><b>Received:</b> June 27, 2021</p> <p><b>Accepted:</b> September 20, 2021</p> <p><b>Online:</b> September 23, 2021</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Pakistan Repercussions, US-led, WOT,</p> <p><b>*Corresponding Author:</b></p> <p>abidnazirsultani@gmail.com</p>	<p>Dating back to 2001, soon after assuming power, Musharraf regime faced with the question regarding Pakistan's stance on War on Terror (WOT). History dictates that Musharraf's decision of presenting Pakistan as a front-line state in the US-sponsored War on Terror (WOT) is the most controversial decision of his times. Various factors coerced Musharraf to offer un-stinted assistance to the US. The empirical and descriptive analysis built on Musharraf's decision to become a part of the US-launched global mission against terrorism, which mainly targeted Al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan, demonstrates two contrasting opinions. One of the arguments is floated by government exponents who believe that the decision was a rational response to the changing global scenario. Whereas, the other segment declares that the decision was entirely taken to cater to personal interests and was not at all in the favor of the nation. However, this decision impacted Pakistan in the longer run. This articles attempts to critically analyse Pakistan's decision and thoroughly discuss the consequences faced. The study aimed to understand the decision made by Pakitan to join war on terror. Its key objective is to thoroughly examine the consequences faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of joining the WOT. The study adopted qualitative approach (i.e. using existing body of literature-books, newspaper, journal articles to draw conclusion). Findings reveal that Pakistan faced economic, social, as well as psychological consequences for joining the US-led war on terror. Moreover, country's image on global level was also severely tarnished.</p>

## Introduction

The historic Terrorism became a grave international problem after the incident of 9/11. In its modern history, the US had never experienced such a massive attack on its land. This attack created a lot of challenges for the American government, such as protection of the global interests of the US and assuring internal security. Consequently, a new war was launched against the new enemy and was termed as "War on Terror". In 2001, a campaign was launched against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, both of which were held responsible for the incident. The US entered this war along with several ally states (Lenzner, 2004). However, Pakistan played the most important role by offering logistic and intelligence support and providing land, air, and water access (Khan, 2013) & (Muzaffar, Khan & Yaseen, 2019)

Dating back to 2001, soon after assuming power, Musharraf regime was faced with the question regarding Pakistan's stance on War on Terror (WOT). History dictates that

Musharraf's decision of presenting Pakistan as a front-line state in the US-sponsored War on Terror (WOT) is the most controversial decision of his times. What were the factors that coerced Musharraf to offer un-stinted assistance to the US, what this decision meant for Pakistan, and how this decision impacted Pakistan are the interrelated issues that would be investigated in this article. The most glaring notion underlying Islamabad's stance to become a part of War on Terror (WOT) was security orientated that eventually pushed the nation to launch a counter-terrorism policy not only at regional and national levels but also at international levels. This decision theoretically complies with Barry Buzan's (1998) idea that declares security as a mixture of internal and external decisions and that the decisions have a multidimensional and cross-national impact. However, Ayoob (1995) lays a different argument by claiming that developing states experience economic, societal, institutional, and political shortcomings which them more vulnerable to the influence or pressure of the developed states. Putting the US-Pakistan partnership in War on Terror (WOT) in his frame of thought would mean that Islamabad's decision to become a US ally was majorly shaped by its weak economic and political position when compared with the US.

Nonetheless, Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for its role in War on Terror (WOT). Before 2001, there had never been any suicide attack in Pakistan but by 2009 more than two hundred suicide attacks and almost five hundred Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonations and bomb, explosions occurred mainly in Khayber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The number of casualties until 2009 reached shocking twenty-nine thousand. It is a fact that this conflict has incurred heavy loss to the people and state of Pakistan. It has also affected the country's progress as a state, constant situation of tension and violence since 2001 has significantly hurdled institution rebuilding, smooth democratic transition, economic development projects in the country. Pakistan was on the verge of being declared a failed state by many analysts, the US itself made this evident in Afghan-PAK policy given by the former president Barack Obama in which both Pakistan and Afghanistan were considered the same (Javaid, 2011). So, the article aims to critically assess the factors that drove Pakistan's decision to join War on Terror (WOT) and extends the discussion to understand how the decision backfired Pakistan.

### **Decision to join War on Terror (WOT)**

The empirical and descriptive analysis built on Musharraf's decision to become a part of the US-launched global mission against terrorism, which mainly targeted Al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan, demonstrates two contrasting opinions. One of the arguments is floated by government exponents who believe that the decision was a rational response to the changing global scenario. Whereas, the other segment declares that the decision was entirely taken to cater to personal interests and was not at all in the favor of the nation. The following analysis is built on the reality which lies in between the two opposite views while admitting the fact that it was never a black and white situation that backed Islamabad's decision. Musharraf's decision was an outcome of dynamic stresses that were thrown at Pakistan following the 9/11 events. Some of them are the threatening posture assumed by the US, growing regional tension, and the prospectus of India in taking the lead in Afghanistan. Such reasoning can be fused with the reformist approach of General Musharraf that believed that Pakistan had been a safe haven and recruiting zone for terrorists who have also targeted the peace of Pakistan. It is argued that with the entry of Pakistan into War on Terror (WOT), a new perspective was given to the security framework which interlocked both internal and external security dynamics. Consequently, a comprehensive, integrated, and upheld national security approach became the utmost need of the hour. Thus the nation's strategic priorities converged with the decision-makers to converge on making Pakistan a frontline ally of the US. However, it remains pertinent to discuss the element that conditioned Musharraf and his supporting institutions to make such a response as the World Trade Center attacks were not a single event but welcomed a series of events. While we unfold such events, we begin with remarks of Richard Armitage, then US deputy secretary of state,

“You are either 100 % with us or 100 % against us. There is no grey area” (Jones, 2002)

At that time Maleeha Lodhi was representing Pakistan to the US as an ambassador so was majorly involved in the communication between Washington and Islamabad. Ms. Lodhi was then given an affirmative response from Musharraf and was asked to convey to Washington that things will happen as per the aspirations of the US. Declaring the decision of becoming a key US partner as “dispassionate” (Pervez, 2006), he maintained:

“The decision was fairly easy. Technically it’s the government’s job to frame counter-terrorism policy...My case was different as I wore multiple hats at that time. That is, being Army Chief, President, and Chief Executive, I had influence over bureaucracy both military and civil, political arenas, academic and intellectual community, civil society...all segments that I briefed and consulted on the decision. The decision was in the best interest of the country” (Musharraf in an interview on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2010)

The statement reflects that Islamabad's decision to ditch the Taliban was not a democratic decision upheld by the consensus of key institutions of Pakistan, instead, it was an individual order of a ruling General who enforced his decision on the institutes working under him. Shamshad Ahmad, an ex-ambassador of Pakistan, has put across a similar opinion in the following statement:

“No matter how necessary or justified the policy turnaround was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on national security and foreign policy issues during the days following 9/11. This was also reminiscent of many earlier policy decisions, including the one of –inventing and then recognizing and supporting the Taliban regime.”(Ahmed, 2009)

The following remarks of military aide of Musharraf will further support the argument:

“The decision was taken earlier and then corps commanders, National Security Council members, and hand-picked political advisers were consulted...In doing so, General Musharraf missed the complexity of the issues involved...He should have drawn the line or limits of support to the United States.” (Fayyaz, 2012)

US was very definite in his demands instead of vaguely requiring Islamabad to stand by him in the War on Terror (WOT). The US communicated a range of following “non-negotiable demand” with Pakistan:

1. Restricting Al-Qaeda’s transborder movement from Afghanistan to Pakistan, seize arms transport through Pakistan, and halt all logistic assistance to Osama bin Laden;
2. Allow US aircraft to use Pakistan's airspace for operations in Afghanistan;
3. Provide access to the US to Pakistani air and naval bases and the junction between Afghanistan and Pakistan;
4. The US should have reached to all the immigration information and intelligence findings;
5. Openly condemn the 9/11 event and refrain from any expression of support for terror outfits;
6. Halt all fuel shipments to Taliban and restrict Pakistan in assisting volunteer support to Taliban in Afghanistan;

7. Since Osama bin Laden and his network was allegedly manifesting in Afghanistan and the Taliban was accused of harboring him and his allies, Pakistan was dictated to end its diplomatic ties with the Taliban government and Taliban groups in Afghanistan and to assist the US in the abovementioned ways to put down Osama and his association (Abbas, 2015).

The analysts were initially bewildered by Pakistan's response to these demands. While some considered it a tactical maneuver, others found it a genuine shift from an earlier pro-Taliban policy of Islamabad. In a public address on September 19, 2001, General Musharraf supported his decision of extending "unstinted" support to the US through following reasons:

1. To protect the strategic interests of Pakistan;
2. To safeguard our interests in Kashmir valley;
3. To prevent the declaration of Pakistan as a terrorist state;
4. To prevent the installation of the anti-Pakistan regime in Kabul;
5. To clear the stained image of Pakistan and profess it as a dignified and responsible nation (Faruqi, 2013).

The decision is believed as an absolute shift in Pakistan long maintained security policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan and redefined the strategic priorities of Pakistan along with multiple novel challenges which had hit Pakistan. Claiming the stance imminent for Pakistan's survival in his public address on September 19, 2001, President Musharraf said,

"...at this juncture, I am worried about Pakistan only...I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later." (Musharraf, 2001)

This reflects that following 9/11, Pakistan started regarding the Taliban regime as a security threat to Pakistan, instead of previous consideration of being an asset. Owing to this close relation between Islamabad and the Taliban prior to Sep 9, 2001, Pakistan had to face international pressure to bring the Taliban to in terms with the international community. Particularly, shutting down training camps and surrendering Osama Bin Laden. Syed Rifaat Hussain, a security analyst, maintained several reasons behind Pakistan's qualitative shift from its pro-Taliban policy:

"Come out on the right side of history; avoid American retribution; prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis against Pakistan with dire consequences for country's survival; a clear sense of gains: get sanctions lifted, put Pak-US ties back on track, gain international legitimacy for his military regime and most importantly create political and social space for Pakistan to deal with the blow-back effects of the Taliban controlled Afghanistan on Pakistani society" (Fayyaz, 2012).

It is worth noticing that even in the situation where global events were revolving around Afghanistan, Pakistan didn't skip mentioning India as one of its major security threats. In fact, India's rivalry was considered as one of the strong reasons to defend Islamabad's pro-US stance in the War on Terror (WOT). The unofficial Indian reports informed Islamabad of India's offers to the US to use its military bases in Avantipur, a state in Indian occupied Kashmir, and Adampur, a state bordering Pakistan which further reaffirmed its speculation about the growing Indian threat. This justifies no shift in strategic planning vis-à-vis India in Musharraf's regime, instead, the threat magnified as Indian began to participate more actively in regional affairs.

One of Musharraf's close security aides stated:

“Indian offer was motivated by a desire to ensure that Pakistan does not gain through an Indian default...Staging ground troops in India could pose a challenge, however, because India and Afghanistan do not share a border. Any troops based in India likely would have to be transported by air over Pakistan”. (Fayyaz, 2012)

Shireen Mazari, ex Director-General of the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, also acceded to this perspective stating:

“India’s increasing presence in Afghanistan directly aggravates Pakistan’s security concerns – especially in terms of low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP. India has established two airbases in Tajikistan and for Pakistan, there is now the possibility of a two-front multiple level threat from India”. (Fayyaz, 2012)

Precisely putting, Musharraf’s pro-US shift in Afghanistan can be defined as a “tactical move” to get rid of some of the major pre-9/11 challenges faced by Pakistan such as faltering economy, political upheavals, and diplomatic isolation along with the motive to prevent India’s plan of gaining a key strategic position in the US campaign in Afghan land. The decision was put across the nation as a strategic necessity and the need to represent Pakistan as a peaceful Muslim state. This justification was in compliance with his pre-9/11 declaration of reforms; thus strengthening its military role. In his deemed reforms, Musharraf clearly stated the urgency of economic revival in the country how much he prioritizes it. He asserted:

“The economy is the key priority. Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays income tax. Our debt burden is \$38 billion, and we have got to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, and broadening our tax base. We also have to privatize our assets, which are being mismanaged, and revive our moribund industries.” (Weaver, 2010)

Soon after Pakistan entered into an international alliance against terrorism, Pakistan got rid of its image as a sanctioned, economically failed, and isolated state. Pak-US relations were once again rose to a high level. In terms of sanctions, then US President Bush scrapped off nuclear test associated economic sanctions and democracy associated sanctions on September 22, 2001, and on October 27, 2001, respectively. Moreover, debt payments were rescheduled. With the withdrawal of sanctions, Islamabad was liable to receive 600 million dollars in Economic Support Funds (ESF) from the US. In total, in 2002, Pakistan was awarded 624 million dollars in both development support and ESF. However, these benefits were only short-lived and Pakistan faced long-term consequences. The next section of the article will elaborate these consequences.

### **Repercussions of Global War on Terror (GWOT) for Pakistan**

Pakistan experienced numerous consequences of joining the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Pakistan's participation not only wreaked havoc on the country's economic, social, and political realms, but it also tarnished Pakistan's image on the global scale. Some of the key repercussions for Pakistan are as follows:

#### **Political Havoc at the Domestic, Regional, and Global Level**

Pakistan had to go through political turmoil after becoming a front-line ally in Global War on Terror (GWOT). The country's political power was hampered by differences of opinion among political figures as well as policymakers. Under the umbrella of "Muthida Majlis-i-Amal" (MMA), religious-political parties used Anti-American sentiment for their personal benefits. Furthermore, Musharraf's prolongation of tenure added fuel, as

Pakistanis were once again subjected to the whims of dictatorship (Javaid & Ali, 2013). The War on Terror (WOT) wreaked havoc on the country's political landscape, with enormous political ramifications at the domestic, regional, and global scale. Terror organizations damaged Pakistan's political system, particularly in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The "Frontier Crimes Regulation" (FCR) oversees tribal regions where "Jirgas" are used to resolve disputes. These Jirgas are expected to work along with the federal govt's tribal councils. Many significant Jirga members fell prey to horrific terrorist activities, which threw the province's political balance into disarray. (Bari, 2010). Even female politicians in the province were targeted, and several of them were harassed and assassinated during terrorist assaults. Pakistan's decision to indulge in War on Terror (WOT) increased the gap between the civilians and armed forces. People who supported the Taliban's cause claimed that the government is fighting a US-led war. On the other side, pro-US individuals claimed that Pakistan's military was a key obstacle to terrorism's containment (Irshad, 2011).

Moreover, in context to regional politics, India took advantage of the chance to label Kashmiri rebels as terrorists and tightened links with a number of countries, notably the United States. The purpose of India's plan was to acquire nuclear weapons and pledge allegiance to Afghanistan's new administration (Javaid, 2011). In terms of Pakistan's global image, Pakistanis had difficulty obtaining visas for the United States, and those that did were subjected to aggressiveness in the form of ridicule at the US airports during the screening procedure. World media began labeling Pakistan as a rogue state, maps depicting its destabilization were released, and the US Congress held regular sessions to oppose economic and military assistance to Pakistan while increasing collaboration with India.

### **Threat to internal and external security**

Pakistan's involvement in the War on Terror (WOT) increased militancy inside the country. Extremist organizations, like the Pakistani Taliban, and its financiers criticized Pakistan's Afghan policies. The decision by America to start intelligence and military action in the tribal areas created a severe danger to national security. Militants started targeting prominent political figures in Pakistan including President Musharraf (Rabbi, 2012). Despite Musharraf's greatest efforts to exterminate all terrorist organizations, he was unable to accomplish his objectives. The US constantly claimed that they have accomplished its goal of crippling extremist groups like Al-Qaida and the Taliban. However, they were unable to justify it because the facts were incongruent. In Pakistan, a new Al-Qaida arose, which established a number of radicalization centers to recruit foreign and local terrorists (Hussain, 2012) & (Karamat, Muzaffar & Shah, 2019). The War on Terror (WOT) thus put the security of Central Asia in general and Pakistan in particular, in jeopardy. The audacious attack on Sargodha Airbase by Osama Bin Laden's men, which resulted in the seizure of "short-range ballistic missiles", was seen as an irrevocable breach of external and internal security. The extremists' access to Pakistan's nuclear facilities sounded the alarm for more security issues in the country. The problem was exacerbated when Obama permitted India to build 6 nuclear reactors with US assistance and to join the "Nuclear Supplier Group" (NSG) without considering the consequences for other regional states, especially Pakistan. Furthermore, Indo-US trade increased to \$ 107 billion in 2015, with America selling nuclear weapons worth \$ 14 billion to India. (Sattar, 2017).

### **Economic Cost**

The War on Terror (WOT) threw Pakistan into economic upheaval. The majority of observers believe that Pakistan's economic downturn is attributable to heightened militant activity (Kronstadt, 2011). After the twin tower attack, Pakistan's economic situation deteriorated drastically. Investors were obliged to reconsider their investment practices in Pakistan due to regional instability. Evidence suggests that in 2001 when Pakistan decided to join War on Terror (WOT), her economy was in poor shape. (Hashmi, 2019, p. 6). Initially, Pakistan's fortunes altered when Musharraf opted to join the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US removed the Symington, Glenn, and Pressler sanctions to give the Musharraf regime

legitimacy. The United States restructured Pakistan's \$400 million loans and urged financial assistance for Pakistan through IMF, WB, and the "Asian Development Bank" (ADB) (Hashmi, 2019). However, in the long run, Pakistan had to pay a hefty cost for US economic assistance. Pakistani troops were stationed on the Afghan border, providing passageways for U.S. forces, and conducting military actions to combat insurgency. It had a significant impact on the country's economy. Between 2006 and 2010, Pakistan's GDP ratio declined from 22.5% to 13.4%.

Pakistan was no more deemed as a tourist attraction. Moreover, millions of refugees and displaced populations gave a tough time to Pakistan's economy. The reality of this tempted economic progress was finally revealed in the PPP rule (2008-2013). The trade deficit multiplied to \$15 billion in 2008 against \$10 billion in 2007. The annual Inflation rate soared unprecedentedly to 20% in 2008 as compared to that of 12% in 2005 (Siddiqui, 2011). The repercussions of participation in War on Terror (WOT) became more prominent with the departure of Musharraf and the assumption of anti-Pakistan and pro-India stance by the US in this War. This new stance resulted in a sharp decline in war-associated benefits from 2007 onwards. Consequently, Pakistan had to bear \$ 6 billion annually, 3 times higher than aid received from the USA. "The cumulative cost of the war on terror from 2001-2002 to 2010-2011 is estimated at \$ 67.9 billion" (Hassan, 2011). Besides, Pakistan also had to bear indirect losses in multiple sectors. For instance, financial reports of the fiscal year 2017-18 dictated that \$1,29.89 million were only spent on compensating the affected families; \$383.83 million were spent on bridging the loss of physical infrastructure; foreign investments plummeted by \$1,234.40 million; industries suffered the damages of \$ 1043.90 million; tax base shrank by \$3,459.69 million; political uncertainties incurred the losses of \$85.24 million, and fiscal deficit stood at \$ 939.37 million.

### **Damage to Education and Human Development**

At the turn of the 21st century, Pakistan's tribal belt had the lowest literacy percentage. In response to military actions, several terror groups started targeting schools that stifled educational advancement. According to a 2009 assessment by the Pakistani state, militants damaged 97 boys' and 118 girls' schools in Swat alone. Furthermore, women's education was at its lowest point, as religious zealots actively dissuade it (Ahmad, 2010). Furthermore, the Education Department of KPK reported that terrorists demolished 758 schools across the province, and prohibited music and other activities (Tariq, 2013). In this vein, a 14-year-old girl who is now a renowned human rights activist was also attacked in 2012.

The number of militant assaults in Pakistan increased dramatically after the 2007 military action against the leadership of the Lal Masjid and the murder of Benazir Bhutto. The pace of human displacement in Pakistan drastically increased afterward. In 2009, ten lac people were displaced in the Swat, and they were living in tents as IDPs (Akhtar, 2012). For clarification, the time of displacement is broken down into 3 phases, beginning in 2008 and till now. The 1st phase started in August 2008, when tensions in the Mohmand and Bajaur regions led 109,654 families to flee their homes. In April 2009, security forces initiated activities in the Malakand area of the NWFP, killing about 2.8 million people. In 2014, More than one lac families were affected by Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Ahmed, 2016). Military actions in tribal belts against radicals resulted in permanent civilian casualties. Terrorists were combated using a variety of techniques. The most crucial step was drone strikes. According to one estimate, 522 drone attacks killed 3852 persons between 2004 and 2015, including 22 al-Qaida top officials, lower and intermediate level militants. (Sattar, 2017). Some noted that "there are fears in Pakistan that American network of espionage has dramatically increased in Pakistan and American drones are killing many innocent citizens on the suspicion of terrorists" (Amin & Naseer, 2013).

From 2001 to 2015, 22,100 civilian deaths, 40992 injuries, and 8214 casualties among security forces occurred as per a report by Dawn. The report also contains information on the deaths of about 31 thousand Taliban and other militants, 92 human rights activists, and 58 journalists. Moreover, the tragic loss of 122 innocent lives at the APS Peshawar on December 16, 2014 rattled the entire nation.

### **Anti State and Anti-Military Sentiment**

The War on Terror (WOT) engendered widespread animosity and hate among Pashtuns in Pakistan, who began to oppose Pakistan's military. As per a poll conducted in 2009, 18 percent of Pakistani Madrassas were suspected of being linked to Jihadi and sectarian groups. 81 percent of madrassa students were against military operations in tribal regions, 78 percent disagreed with Pakistan's position in the war, and 20 percent believed the emergence of uprisings within the country was a product of Pakistan's involvement in War on Terror (WOT) (Ahmad, 2010). The assassination of two Lahore residents by Raymond Davis (a former CIA agent), "Operation Neptune Spear" in Abbottabad, and NATO forces' strike on Salala Airbase in 2011 all contributed to a rise in anti-American and anti-military sentiment among citizens (Ejaz, 2016).

### **Pakistan's Tainted Image and Associated Psychological Strains**

At the domestic and global levels, Pakistan's reputation has been severely harmed by the War on Terror (WOT). Fear, mass displacement, and a Taliban threat to Pakistan's integrity have been consistent throughout the conflict. All of these issues were continuously highlighted by the foreign media, which further contributed to the distortion of the country's reputation. Almost every country in the world agrees that Islamabad has done everything possible to control militancy, yet Washington continued to insist on the "do more" policy (Safdar & Budiman, 2018), which put the country in enormous strain. The US representative's provocative remarks and assessments mirrored Pakistan's broken image on the global stage. Pakistan was accused of assisting North Korea in the development of nuclear plants. India also accused Pakistan of providing weapons to freedom fighters in IOK on several occasions. Many Pakistan army officers have been accused of assisting the Taliban through intelligence services (Hashmi, 2005).

All of this generated a feeling of insecurity in the nation. The extent of inculcation of emotional and psychological difficulties like depression, anxiety, and others was evident in people's behavior. Violent acts by terrorists negatively impacted almost every Pakistani, either directly or indirectly. In Pakistan, television stations are thought to be one of the main sources of instilling fear in the people. This yellow journalism affected nearly 91.5% of university students in Pakistan (Ahmed & Khan, 2016). Terrorist activities frightened Pakistani citizens to the point where many of the country's brightest people decided to flee to Canada, the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries. As per various estimates, the numbers of immigrants reached 4156957 between 2005 and 2014, with 5795 teachers, 9040 doctors, and 29377 engineers among them (Ahmed & Zeb, 2015). The influx of these bright brains caused great damage to Pakistani society.

### **Conclusion**

The role of Pakistan as a front ally in Global War on Terror (GWOT) indicates that since the beginning, Pakistan went above and beyond to assist in the US-led war, apprehending and targeting Al Qaida and other foreign militants operating in the country, and providing complete land, air, and seaport accessibility, as well as a slew of other security and logistical help. Owing to the benefits of having a peaceful neighbourhood, Pakistan also made constant effort to bring both the parties to the peace table. Despite Pakistan's constant efforts on combating the threat of terrorism and aiding the peace process, she failed to receive enough appraisal from the world. Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for indulging in War on Terror (WOT). Although Musharraf regime hardly had any other option at that time



than to join the War on Terror (WOT), the decision caused significant issues of social, economic, and political nature for the country. Moreover, US-Taliban conflict not only tarnished Pakistan's image but also gave rise to xenophobic trends against the Muslims in the Western world. These xenophobic trends are prevalent till date. This implies the dire need of rebuilding the image of Muslim community in general and Pakistan in particular. Conclusively, Pakistan has numerous lessons to learn from her decision of indulging in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

## References

- Abbas, H. (2015). *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. Routledge.
- Ahmad, M. (2010). Implications of the War On Terror for Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan. *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*, (3).
- Ahmed, S. (2009). Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Policy Making Process. *Foreign Policy Making Process, Karachi, University of Karachi*, 55.
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Khan, Z. (2016). Direct and indirect impacts of terrorism on youth in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 53(1).
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Khan, Z. (2016). Direct and indirect impacts of terrorism on youth in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 53(1).
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Zeb, K. (2015). Impacts of terrorism-related violence on Pakistan and its youth. *Journal of People's Studies-Volume*, 1(2), 40.
- Akhtar, S. (2012). Dynamics of USA-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 period: Hurdles and future prospects. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 2(11), 205-213.
- Amin, M., & Naseer, R. (2013). Pakistan-US mistrust and regional security challenges in South Asia: a prolonged indecisive, futile war seeks end. *Margalla Papers*, 17(1), 153-176.
- Ayoob, M. (1995). *The third world security predicament: State making, regional conflict, and the international system*. L. Rienner Publishers.
- Bari, F. (2010). *Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism / Talibanization in Pakistan*. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Ejaz, A. (2016). US Policy on Kashmir Dispute in the post-cold war period. *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society Lahore*, 29(1), 26-29.
- Faruqui, A. (2013). Pakistan: The Garrison State—Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947–2011. In: Taylor & Francis.
- Fayyaz, S. (2012). *Pakistan response towards terrorism: a case study of Musharraf regime* [University of Birmingham].
- Hashmi, R. S. (2005). War on terrorism: Impact on Pakistan's economy. *Political Science Department PU Lahore*.
- Hashmi, R. S. (2005). War on terrorism: Impact on Pakistan's economy. *Political Science Department PU Lahore*.
- Hassan, Z. (2011). Economic survey of Pakistan 2010-2011. *Growth and Investment: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance*.
- Hussain, Z. (2012, June 12). Al Qaeda battleground. *Dawn*.
- Irshad, M. (2011). Terrorism in Pakistan: Causes & Remedies. *Dialogue (Pakistan)*, 6(3).
- Javaid, U. (2011). War on terror: Pakistan's apprehensions. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 5(3), 125-131.

- Javaid, U., & Ali, Z. (2013). War on terror partnership: Problems and prospects for Pakistan. *Journal of Political Studies*, 20(1), 51.
- Jones, O. B. (2002). *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press).
- Karamat, S., Muzaffar, M., & Shah, A. S. (2019). Politics of Religious Extremism in Pakistan: An Analysis, *Review of Economics and Development Studies*, 5 (2), 315-322
- Khan, H. (2013). Pakistan's Contribution to global war on terror after 9/11. *IPRI Journal*, 13(1), 37-56.
- Khan, H. (2013). Pakistan's Contribution to global war on terror after 9/11. *IPRI Journal*, 13(1), 37-56.
- Khan, Z. A. (2011). Military operations in FATA and PATA. *Strategic Studies*, 31, 129-146.
- Knabe, G., Fatemi, T., Ahmad, A., Cheema, P. I., Mohmand, R. S., & Yousafzai, R. (2011). Afghanistan Imbroglio: An Appraisal. *Policy Perspectives*, 8(1), 1-19.
- Kronstadt, K. A. (2011, October). Pakistan-US relations: A summary. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
- Lenzner, J. F. (2004). From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession's Uncertain Journey in the US-Led War on Terror. *Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L.*, 12, 297.
- Musharraf, P. (2001). Address by General Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan delivered as a broadcast on radio and television from Islamabad on September 19, 2001. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 67(24), 754.
- Muzaffar, M., Khan, I., & Yaseen, (2019). End Game Or A New Great Game? Indo-Pakistan Rivalry and Post Withdrawal Afghanistan, *Asian Journal of International Peace & Security (AJIPS)*, 3, 1-11
- Pervez, M. (2006). *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. New York, London & Toronto: Simon & Schuster Inc.
- Rabbi, F. (2012). War against Terrorism and its Repercussions for Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 33(2), 71-90
- Safdar, A., & Budiman, A. M. (2018). Reportage of War on Terror by Pakistani Print Media: With Agenda setting perspective. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, 38(1).
- Sattar, A. (2017). *Pakistan's foreign policy, 1947-2016: A concise history*. Oxford University Press.
- Scahill, J. (2009). The secret US war in Pakistan. *The Nation*
- Weaver, M. A. (2010). *Pakistan: In the shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.