



RESEARCH PAPER

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) vs. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad): A Perspective of a Game Theory

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PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
<p>Received: July 18, 2021</p> <p>Accepted: October 06, 2021</p> <p>Online: October 08, 2021</p> <p>Keywords: Containment, Expansionism, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)</p> <p>*Corresponding Author: matifhussain810@gmail.com</p>	<p>Containment is the central part of the U.S.'s foreign policy during the cold war. With the application of containment Policy, the U.S. achieved much success in international politics. Over time China has become more powerful and sees great power in international politics. China wants to expand and launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The primary purpose of The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to achieve support from regional countries and save their interests from the U.S. In 2017, the American administration launched its Containment policy through Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) to keep their interest from China. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is comprising of Australia, the United States, Japan, and India. This Study is based on Qualitative research with theoretical application of Game theory. This research investigates both plans of China (BRI) and the U.S. (the Quad) through a Game Theory. In this study, China and the U.S. both like to act as gamers in international politics. This study recommends that Game theory can predict all developments in the long term.</p>

Introduction

The diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China are very important for the international community. The causes for this importance are simple: the United States and China are the two largest countries and the most important economic power in the world. Although China's military power and expenditure persist far behind those of the U. S. China's increasingly forceful political and defense initiatives are placing more emphasis on their neighboring countries as well as the U.S. The emergence of China not only reflects a traditionally extraordinary structural evolution of the global financial system but also directly challenges the U.S.'s tactical supremacy. In simple, U.S.-China relations reflect a significant institutional evolution of the global community and the resource division of power.

There appears to be an increasing prevailing opinion in China that US-China linkages will stay shaky for the years ahead. Nonetheless, President Xi Jinping and several others have claimed that period and acceleration are on China's hands with its struggle to push nearer to the center point of the international arena. Chinese government accepts that

challenges may need to be given the opportunity for their state to achieve its global objectives. To that side, China makes it appear to be developing a three-pronged variable strategic plan: preserving a semi surrounding world in favor of focusing on national objectives; reduce dependency on America while expanding reliance on China by the international community; and extend the scope of Chinese institutions to abroad. Simultaneously, China's motives are eliciting a solid response overseas (Hass, 2021). The strategic consequences of China's rapid increase in the Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, and surmise with a discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiative and China-Asian linkages match into China's desire to consolidate the East Asian economy (Liu, Spring 2018).

Theoretical Framework

Although the implementation of game theory in global politics is not new, its prominence has recently increased (Snidal, 1985). This emergence is already related to new uses of game models in international politics. This is an immediate counter-argument to the centric use of strategic analysis to relate directly to global politics. Game theory is the study of decision-making under the assumption that all contestants are logical and rational. In the Game theory, almost every individual's objective is to expand their earnings and enhance Political and financial benefits. Game theory is a subject with numerous application fields and politics, international relations, economics, Philosophy, and other natural and social sciences. In the mid-1900s, mathematician John Forbes Nash presented the most fundamental tenets of this area (Author Ronak Datta, Rohan Gupta & Alice Li, 2020).

China and the U.S. are undoubtedly contemporary most powerful great powers. Given their overwhelming power, the measures taken during this era will have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. As a result, we can say that each state is taking the most rational decision for the sake of global politics. If the U.S. creates a containment policy for China through Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), it will favor them. This is because China loss the economic and political impact in Asia to Europe. The same applies to China if they succeed in The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They will create a great connection with Asia to Europe and global impact also. Although both of these results are considered, the states are now viewed as being in Nash Equilibrium. Both global powers will almost definitely start the conflict with their initiatives.

This article aims to prove rationally that game theory is suitable for clarifying international initiatives like BRI vs (the Quad). Global initiatives may develop the game theory to describe the complex and stressful interactions, i.e. whenever the result of an engagement would be collaboratively top reasons in the lack of initiatives. Furthermore, game theory offers several rationally sourced factors that show us the potential risk of staying close to members of international initiatives.

China

China is the 4th largest country in the world and 20% population of the world lived in China (Schiavenza, 2013). The economy of China is the world's largest economy in the term of PPP. China is going forward on the way to reducing poverty over the last 70 years.

According to the World Bank, 850 million Chinese people reduce poverty and 70 % global poverty reduction (Huaxia, 2020). The living standard of pupils in China has been improving. The leadership of China is also aware of its challenges in shifting its model of growth. In the last two decades, the growth model has been working very well and helping to bolster infrastructure. To increase their impact, the Government of China draws new plans and strategies and presents a new course of action to deal with their competitor in the region.

Before these development projects, China wasn't regarded as "going up" globally. Extreme western interference, political clashes among Communist party and Nationalist groups, and a deadly military conflict 1937–1945 with Japan, led by a civil conflict, all took place. Mao Zedong popular 1949 Communist Takeover resulted in the 1958–1962 Significant Step Win, which significantly diminished agricultural output in China and resulted in widespread famine, although the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution did throw the nation into a couple of years of centralized challenges and political unrest (Liu, Spring 2018). Even if China had started to regain from the deadly effects of the Cultural Revolution besides 1976, it was still a geopolitically third-world country compared to developed Europe and Japan. It wasn't until Deng Xiaoping's ascension in 1978 and the implementation of slow but steady economic liberalization that China started to return to the way to progress.

Nicholas Kristof's famous essay "The Rise of China" appeared in Foreign Affairs journal in 1993 (Kristof, 1993). The essay drew instant recognition because it was the 1st debate of the Chinese factor in a popularly broadcasted journal. A quarter-century later, the paper is still meaningful because most topics are relevant: China's economic growth, the expanded Chinese impact around the globe, and the escalation of international tensions in the East China Sea and South.

While Kristof's essay was published in 1993, China had been in the wake of a duration of rapid economic development, including its financial system, expanding at a rate of 10% per year on average. In the Post-Cold War period, China's rapid growth was mirrored at the beginning of the millennium by a period of strong growth that reached over 10% each year for decades. Such expansion served as the backdrop for a further World Affairs article in 2005, aptly labeled "China's Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status." According to Chinese philosopher and government adviser Zheng Bijian, "China will not pursue dominance or prevalence in global affairs... China's progress is dependent on global stability, which in turn is dependent on China's advancement" (Bijian, 2005).

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

In 2013, the Chinese President declared the BRI initiative through formal visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. BRI initiative was divided into two sections: the inland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. Both were initially known as the One Belt, One Road initiative, but were later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative. (Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, 2020) Chinese President XI presented China's most important foreign policy and economic initiatives in 2013 (Cai, 2017). With the launch of BRI, China's foreign policy has become more force full (Johnson, 2016). The 18th party of Congress of China was held in 2013. Before this Congress, policymakers and thinkers of China were active debates about the important direction of countries foreign policy special in context to the neighbors (Kun, 2015).

BRI is a new strategy to link China with Asia, Europe, and Africa. As Asia and Europe, China has significant interests in Africa (Muhammad Atif, Muqarrab Akbar, 2019) China wants to construct infrastructure for these reasons for an economic boost. China creates a win-win situation for the Alpha layers of the project. Some thinker Says that BRI is a Chinese version of the Marshall plan with some differences because the aim of marshal of the plan was not to construct the new markets. Marshall Plan aimed to increase the influence of the U.S. in Europe and containment the power of the USSR. As same, BRI seeks to increase the strength of China and containment the power of the U.S. in the region. And another significant difference of the Marshall Plan is that the main stakeholder of the Marshall Plan was the only U.S., and they implemented their plan very carefully and slowly. In contrast, BRI is presented by the newly established Asian Infrastructure Bank IIAB, with over 50 partners. Consequently, So many e partners are a risk for the project of OBOR (Shafei Moiz Hali, Dr. Tan Shukui & Sumera Iqbal, 2014).



Picture No: 1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese Expansion

The South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are two hotly debated issues between the United States and China. Several experts evaluate, China's focuses across island-building and army power grid in South China and Taiwan Strait, whereas the Belt and Road Initiative focuses on connectivity for international investment and trade across Asia, Europe, and Africa. But China's influential external initiatives are far more than close to the eye. China's former Sea of Silk Roads, the South China Sea ancient times have played a major part. Ships sailing from China's eastern coast delivered products around the world. (Fowler, 2020)

The BRI has indeed played a vital part in intercontinental affairs with the South China Sea. The area has the main international shipping routes, which may well develop as China expands trade with Europe, Africa, and South Asia. China's Chinese Government initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, and manufacturing on armed forces arrangement in the South China Sea's Paracel Islands starts shortly thereafter in 2014. (Fowler, 2020)

With the declaration of BRI, Chinese investment has swept into the globe, that far intensifying the globe's financial cooperation. Between 2014 and 2019, the overall trade amount with nations across the BRI entered 44 trillion RMB, with 9.27 trillion RMB only in 2019. (WTO, 2019) The BRI nations have grown by 2 % from 2018 to 30 % in 2019 in overall Chinese trade. China has preserved its status as the globe's top trading nation, with China serving as the primary trading mate for 124 nations. (Xing, 2018) China was the globe's biggest goods supplier for the second year in a row in 2017 and 2018, accounting for 13% (US\$ 2.49 trillion) of global exports and 11% (US\$ 2.14 trillion) of global imports. (Xiaoxia, 2020)

China has been effective in countering its critiques by utilizing global organizations. All through China's yearly Belt and Road Forum in 2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced cooperation among the BRI and the SDGs. The secretary-general - supports was not speculative. The approval formalized collaboration between BRI and SDG programming in several underdeveloped nations. Even as government-to-government donors frequently collaborate with UN agencies on broad issues, this was the first time the United Nations had collaborated on project planning, investment, and brand recognition. (Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, 2019)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is very important to China. It's a chance to broaden the scope of their financial progress. It's also a planned rethinking of China's role in the globe, as well as a strategic ability to maximize impact in areas like international governance and capacity-building programs.

United States of America

The United States reinforced its Cold War allies that it established to contain the Soviets. Later, when the United States appeared as a global superpower in the Second World War, it was among the leading powers when the new global order and power structures were formed in 1945. This had incomparable industrial skills, economic power,

and defense capacity at its great expense. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 contributed to the formation of the U.S. as the powerful global power in the global order. It had the potential of developing global influence. It had the reserves practicing its dominant position over other nations because of the redistribution of power. An international superpower tends to play a vital role in structuring, adjusting, and sustaining the globe's political system (Boff, 2003).

Slowly, supremacy across the U.S. has been threatened. Switching economic and political power to Asia in general, China has changed the face of global politics and economy in the last fifteen years. The great depression of 2008 or its aftereffects is seen as the turning point of Asia's upswing. Beijing gave rise to the initiatives to stabilize the global financial system and boost growth. Consequently, the widespread United States supremacy is under threat (Fayyaz, S, MalikS, 2020). The World Bank reported that in 2018, China's economy was \$22.5 hundred billion, while the U.S. was \$18.2 hundred billion. This indicates which China's economy creates a substantial threat to the supremacy of the U.S. and its financial system (Arrighi, 2005).

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad)

The Quadrilateral partnership was initially a result of an earthquake namely the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. The initial reaction was the "Tsunami Core Group" set up by the US, Japan, Australia, and India to support the cooperation of rescue operations. This program aimed to resolve the challenging issues of the tsunami or its aftereffects, and therefore it was not ever expected to be long-lasting (Grossman, 2005). The quadrilateral concept, however, soon developed into someone else too much (Madan, 2017). Japan was interested in setting up value-based ties to construct an "arc of security and prosperity" across the area (Aso, 2006). In August 2007, in the parallel of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Meeting placed in the Philippines. Four countries started to discuss possibilities for more participation. The following year, they, together with Singapore, took part in significant naval exercises, an expansion that came under fire from Beijing (Ramesh Thakur, 2018) (Nicholson, 2007).

Consequently, these initial coordination initiatives started raising conflicts over the integrated plan of the Quad. In 2008, Australia had explained issues about the Quad and its effect on Sino-Australian affairs and had dismissed from additional discussion of this origin (O'Malley, 2008). India, as well, was upset regarding the impact that the Quad would have on its international affairs (Madan, 2017). Consequently, inspiration for the Quad subsided, and the concept primarily vanished from international politics. The Quad was not closed, however, but simply in a long break. Remarkable progress in the discussion appeared in 2017 (Ramesh Thakur, 2018). The four countries resumed their talk the second time in the Philippines, this time on the parallel of the East Asia Summit. After that, they agreed to follow "ongoing dialogue and intensifying coordination shared values and practices" (DFAT, 2017).



Picture No: 2 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad)

Approximately ten years after it had been dormant, The Quad was reunited in November 2017. Washington, Delhi, and Canberra have common issues with Chinese foreign policy. After many years of debate and rising trust, warmth, and integration among the four democratic countries, they officially restored the Quad. President Trump rapidly warmed to the Quad idea during its first year in office. August 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson communicated its reemergence with the foreign ministers of Australia and Japan in the side meeting of an ASEAN meeting in Manila. The idea was promoted with India during a visit to Delhi by U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis later that month, and it was reaffirmed in an October statement in Washington by Secretary Tillerson (Rex W. Tillerson and John J. Hamre, 2017). Japanese People reelected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in October 2017, and Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Kano announced that Japan would formally suggest a comprehensive Quad conference in November on the parallel meeting of a sequence of multilateral summits in Asia (Saki Hayashi and Yosuke Onchi, 2017). After two days, President Trump supported Kano's suggestion.

Delhi quickly indicated that it was open to the idea. "India is available to collaborating for like states on problems that develop our objectives and encourage our viewpoint," a government statement (Shubhajit Roy, 2017). The first Quad meeting took place within a month, parallel to the 31st ASEAN summit in Manila. In the two-hour session, the government official of four democratic countries discussed the strategy to reach shared interests and resolve major risks in the area (DFAT, 2017). A month ago, in December 2017, the Quad directly supported the Trump Government's National Security Strategy, which agreed to boost quadrilateral collaboration with Japan, Australia, and India (House, 2017).

The Quad and US Containment

The containment plan has played a leading role in Mr. Trump's wider China strategy, as evidenced by decisions such as its disputed islands activities in the Pacific, the concepts of an Indo-Pacific theatre, and its already adoption of non-treaty allied nation Taiwan. He has also attempted to contain China's financial influence through a troubling trade war, as well as its aspirations to control important strategic innovations such as 5G technology. These actions are based, in aspect, on the examples set by Trump's successors. However, the Trump administration introduced an argumentative reminiscent of Cold War containment, implying at periods that the eventual aim of its China strategy is to dismantle the Chinese Communist Party regime. (Zelleke, 2020) Trump recognized the importance of alliances in his China containment policy. His initiatives were concentrated on the Indo-Pacific, in which he assisted in the formation of the China-centered Quad security alliance comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. (Zelleke, 2020)


The Quad began its work in May 2007, after which it hibernated for the next ten years. Its restoration in November 2017 intrigued Chinese attention because it matches into a previously established plan that the US was planning a Cold War-style scene to tactically contain China by attaching India as a participant, aided by Japan. If the US pursued a containment policy, China would bear resistance not only across its eastern border, where Japan holds important locations on the first island chain, but also growingly across its southern and western sides. According to several Chinese experts, the Quad is forming an "Asian NATO." (WUTHNOW, 2021) While participants of the Quad have rejected to directly mention China as an objective of their dialogues, Chinese experts have never doubted that this is all regarding containment of China.

The US Secretary of State and the foreign ministers of Australia, India, and Japan gathered in Tokyo On October 6, 2020. The main agenda of the meeting was to negotiate issues about the Indo-Pacific region's security and cooperation. (Hines, 2020) The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a combination of countries formed in reaction to an increasing impact of China where its financial and armed power is blocking progress in an already existing world order. China sees the Quad as a challenge, a direct plan across which four nations are banding together. Moreover, Beijing sees this cooperation as a last-ditch effort by the US to sustain its authority.

Participating in war games with the other Quad participant nations, like the Malabar naval exercises, incorporates India into security concerns outside of its seashore. Although the Quad's intentions eventually concentrate on China, attention is also drawn to India, a nation that has, to some notion, taken a back seat in global politics. Its set to enter the Quad is motivated by concerns that China is progressively encroaching on the Indian Ocean. India has traditionally planned to focus on problems with neighboring nations, such as peacekeeping in Afghanistan and dispute with Pakistan and China, and others. (Hines, 2020) The Quad plans to contain an emerging China or protected the Indo-Pacific area overall will establish whether this is the start of a new Cold War. Meanwhile, game theory with China will persist.

A Game theory perspective behind BRI VS The Quad

China has two options in this game. Firstly, China wants expansionism through The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the global level. Otherwise, they can admit the growing containment policy by the U.S. If China selects this plan, the U.S. has two options.



Simple initiative tree for Game theory

Firstly, they can select the containment policy for China through The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad) or initiate the new game. If the U.S. decides the second option and does nothing, then the initiative game ends to happen. Alternatively, China can also select no expansionism in reaction to the U.S. containment policy. AS a result, the present position remains the same and the initiative war endures. A simple initiative tree can exemplify this setting. Suppose both powers enforce the expansion Policy on each other with global initiatives like The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) OR Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad). In that case, they will finally touch a Nash Equilibrium.

While game theory can only forecast so much in real-world positions, it can usually visualize greater global initiative. The initiative war was first started in 2013 when China launched The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2017, the U.S. responded by launching the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad) to contain China. According to the Foreign Minister of Japan, the objective of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is to save a nonviolent maritime region from Asia to Africa. All countries as well as China and its OBOR will take benefit from free and unrestricted seas. (Saki Hayashi and Yosuke Onchi, 2017) China again reacted by launching Polar Silk Road through the Arctic Ocean (Xinhua, 2018). China’s growing importance in the Artic has driven apprehensions from regional states over its long-drawn expansion plans containing likely army utilization. The main goal of China’s BRI initiative is to link with the Middle East and Europe, and they developed substantial structure through lots of states, showing Xi’s wish for China to acquire a geopolitical role for China (Staff, 2018).

The initiative war from both sides is working on the game theory. The meeting of G-7 took place on 12 June 2021. During this meeting, The President of the USA, Joe Biden, announced an infrastructure initiative for underdeveloped nations to counter China's impact. The name of the new global initiative is Build Back Better World (B3W). (El-Bar, 2021) US President Joe Biden has hoped the B3W plan, which we support, to be an excellent option to a comparable China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). (News, 2021)

Conclusion

Both the United States and China have distinctive pasts and backgrounds, which establishes an intriguing circumstance. Their lack of desire to collaborate in the initiative stems from undesirable deals and ideological distinctions. The United States remains the symbol of capitalism, even as China is a major Communist force. Taking this into account, there will undoubtedly be difficulties for both states to quit the game theory in international initiatives.

To examine the history of China and the U.S., they act as a gamer in several types of a global initiative. Hong Kong issue, the ban on Huawei and Tik Tok, green politics, Covid-19, BRI, and the Quad are the main examples of game theory. The U.S. wants to stabilize its international order by using the containment policy against China, and China intends to increase its global impact by using expansionism. The game theory has full ability to explain the behavior of both states and game theory does always exercises as well in apply as it does in theory. It is a fact to explain that both initiatives (BRI vs. The Quad) will not break the Nash Equilibrium expected by game theory and end initiative war.

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