



## RESEARCH PAPER

### US Grand Strategy Failure towards Afghanistan in Post 9/11 Era

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PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
<p><b>Received:</b> October 13, 2021</p> <p><b>Accepted:</b> December 29, 2021</p> <p><b>Online:</b> December 31, 2021</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda Grand Strategy, United States</p> <p><b>*Corresponding Author:</b>  faimamunawarr@gmail.com</p>	<p>This study aims to explore why the US' post-Cold War global policy has largely been unsuccessful to fulfil American goals when it comes to regional extremist fights. Using Afghanistan as a case study, this study evaluates the various US government and administration's contradictions, inconsistencies, loop holes, and grand strategy frameworks that have trapped the nation in lengthy counter-terrorism battles and hampered the nation's prospects of finishing the hostilities effectively in the previous two decades. Soon after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the US' Grand strategy emphasis shifted to combatting as well as eradicating terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and the African continent. The US/Afghan war is a governmental issue of exceptional power, in which the Afghan rebel structure influences the conflictual behavior, and the US as a tremendous power exploits September 11. Finally, this study will propose policy propositions to help the US make effective policies regarding where and with what rationale to spend tax money, risking the lives of Americans, and improve the country's strategic competency regarding future dynamic confrontations particularly against autocratic regimes and transnational jihadist activities.</p>

## Introduction

The tragedy Following 9/11, the United Governments' grand strategy has emphasized the strengthening of weak states through economic, social, and political development initiatives, as well as the use of all weapons of national power to combat terrorist ideologies. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had a significant influence on US foreign policy (Mandelbaum, 6). The United States used it's armed, financial, and diplomatic tactics, in the South Asian region for the first time since the Cold War. The 20 years conflict in the Afghan Land is commonly seen as one of the many Cold War-era American international policy blunders. Nearly \$1 trillion has been spent on the conflict, with over 2,300 US military people killed and over 20,000 others injured. A half-million people are estimated to have died (Malkasian, 2020).

Across length of Presidents Bush, Barack Hossain Obama, and Donald J. Trump's administrations in Afghanistan, the US has constantly been bent upon on destroying Al-Qaeda and preventing the Afghan land from turning into a safe haven for global extremists. Although the United States acquired its first critical aim to defeat the Al-Qaeda and limiting its ability to turn Kabul into a safe haven to threaten the US, when the Afghan Taliban and other extremist organizations recovered power and proceeded to pose a threat to American

objectives. In the light of these dangers, US international policy still proceeds to achieve counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency initiatives, as well as investments in political change and financial betterment, so as to complete its strategy in Kabul on terms that are acceptable to US objectives (National Security Strategy, 2019).

At that time, George Washington's aims in Kabul, as stated in the National Security Strategy 2017 and the 2019 United States South and Central Asia Joint Regional Strategy, are to prevent extremist groups from exploiting Kabul to target the United States, its population, and alliances overseas. The US works toward this aim by advocating a comprehensive political settlement between both the Kabul government and the Terrorists to end the violence and guarantee Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe haven for foreign terrorists. In order to aid in the establishment of a long-term Kabul political solution that would support security in Afghan and the greater South and Central Asia area, US policy outlines the following goals:

1. Work with regional countries to urge them to aid Kabul in resolving the situation peacefully
2. Promote an Afghan government that is secure, democratic, and constitutional, avoids ethnic divides, leads responsibly, and respects women's rights.
3. Strengthen Afghanistan's economy and regional economic integration to secure the country's economic viability and improve ties with its neighbors (Armitage, Berger & Markey, 2010)

It is critical to examine and identify policy flaws that have frequently embroiled the United States in lengthy counter-terrorism efforts. This chapter will look at the discrepancies, ambiguities, and disconnects in Washington Bush's strategies, decision-making, funding, and execution challenges that have entangled the United States in a costly two decade war in Afghanistan.

## **Failures of the United States in Afghanistan**

### **Disordered and Fluctuating Objectives**

For mission success and stability in Afghanistan, clear objectives are required. Unfortunately, the United States' objectives were not always clear or uniform among military, diplomatic, and development organizations, resulting in mission failure and an unwinnable scenario. The US mission and objectives in Afghanistan have changed significantly during the last two decades, spanning three political governments, several top generals, and various Kabul ministries. The justification for entering Afghanistan was first defined as destroying Al-Qaeda, deposing the Taliban, and preventing another assault on the United States and its allies. After the fall of the Taliban government and the defeat of Al-Qaeda in 2001, the US operation in Kabul increased as it added new priorities to its counter-terrorism campaign.

The aims and tactics of the US in Afghanistan became increasingly murky as time went on. To deter al-Qaeda as well as other extremist organizations from penetrating Afghanistan, the US recognized that the Afghan government should be secure enough to provide security and basic services, and violence must be significantly lowered to develop economic, political, and social prospects. As a result, the United States began on missions of nation-building and social engineering. However, America's objectives to restructure Afghanistan's domestic affairs while fighting an adaptable and regenerative enemy in a

region severely damaged by 40 years of conflict were impossible to accomplish and destined to fail without a consistent, clear, adequately resourced, protracted strategy and the support of the American people. Consequently, there is no easy way out of a losing battle (Whitelock, 2019) (Muzaffar, et. al. 2021).

Despite the fact that US international policy has been extremely ambitious, overly engaged in the domestic affairs of other nations, and overwhelmingly bent upon advancing American ideals and Western values throughout the previous two decades, each government has continued to pursue them. The aims and mission of the US government, including the Pentagon, the White House, and the State Department, changed over time. Many Americans sought to use the conflict to turn Kabul into a democracy, while many others wanted to change the Afghani society, and still others wanted to modify the regional power balance between Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia (Dempsy, 2019).

### **Uneven and Inconsistent Policy Shifts**

Years of perplexing, conflicting, and fluctuating American tactics, along with a misguided goal, resulted in the Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other Islamist Mujahedeen resurrecting, perpetuating the Afghan struggle. The underpaid and disorganized construction operations exposed policy weaknesses in the United States early on. When Donald Rumsfeld, the former American Secretary of Defense said, "We've obviously shifted from substantial combat action to a time of security, stability, and rebuilding efforts,". US and other nations began making massive expenditures in Afghanistan's state-building (Rumsfeld, 2003). Oddly, the rules, strategies, and programs for such a project were ill-conceived, inaccurate, underfunded, and inconsistent. In their attempts to develop institutions, NATO nations were divided incoherently, with each sponsoring the development of certain ministries. Wealth was pouring in at alarming rates, greatly beyond the Afghan economy's and institutions' capacity to handle it, leading to rampant corruption and deceptive practices. As a result of these policy mistakes in the United States, the Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist groups have had more space or time to develop their capabilities and strength (McMaster, 2020).

While the first US policy in Afghanistan was militarily effective in eliminating the Taliban, it was classified as a "light approach" with considerable drawbacks. With the help of US airpower and anti-Taliban militias, a tiny footprint of US Special Operations Forces and CIA operations left US forces with insufficient troops to travel across the nation collecting intelligence and attacking the enemy in a deteriorating security situation. Furthermore, because of this "light approach," US commanders were left with inadequate soldiers to block terrorist escape routes and discover and destroy terrorist hideouts. The aspects of the plan targeted at collapsing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by denying them access to money and support were underfunded and abandoned prematurely (Nelson & Sanderson, 2011).

During the Obama administration, the American strategy for Afghanistan shifted from a time-based approach to a condition-based technique at the onset of the Trump presidency, then back to a time-based outlook by the end of the President Trump's tenure, exacerbating the hurdles of winning the conflict and thus lengthening it (Dobbin, 2019). In 2009, President Barack Obama advocated a new approach that connected Afghan success to a secure Pakistan, increasing aid to Pakistan to destabilize, dismantle, and eliminate al Qaeda and its safe havens. In addition, the new strategy strengthened military presence in Afghanistan, established a timeline for troop departure, and brokered a peace agreement with the Taliban, who were traditionally identified as adversaries. The American government under President Barack Hossein Obama ditched Bush's counter-terrorism

strategy in favor of a compromise that included 150,000 US and NATO troops, as well as an inflow of global monetary help to the Afghan government, which was unable to integrate and manage the funds.

While the Obama administration imposed restrictions on how the military could engage, the Trump administration reversed course by dismissing nation-building, authorizing the mobilization of up to 7,000 additional US troops, expanding targeting authority, and allowing airstrikes to assist Afghan ground forces (Wall street journal,2019). At the conclusion of his presidency, President Trump reversed course and abandoned his earlier vow to assist the Kabul government in combating the Taliban factions, and his government sent mixed signals regarding the Taliban's resolve to separate from the Al-Qaeda. Changing policies and an uncoordinated methods reinforced and encouraged opponents, with cash earmarked for reconstruction help falling into their hands through fraudulent ways in certain cases (Clayton, 2020).

Furthermore, frequent declarations that the US military would depart without outcome-based timeframes weakened US allies' and other foreign partners' commitment to the operation. Such pronouncements fueled doubts about the US mission's dependability and commitment, emboldening the Taliban, destabilizing the Afghan government, and allowing terrorist organizations to regroup. The Trump government's decision to remove American forces from Afghanistan in 2020, for example, has harmed diplomatic attempts to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban (Ayotte, Dunford & Lindborg, 2020). Furthermore, US strategy first aimed to undermine and degrade the Taliban, but eventually switched to consider the Taliban a partner rather than an opponent. As a result, the Taliban grew more powerful, captured more land, and increased their attacks on Afghani security personnel and populace. Over the last 20 years, US administration has shifted its focus away from the Taliban organization and toward the Al-Qaeda network in Pakistan, erroneously assuming that the same neighboring Pakistan that harbors over tens and dozens of extremist factions would be a counterterrorism ally in destroying Al-Qaeda. The United States' illusion and false belief that the Taliban is unaffiliated with other extremist organizations, or that they would not communicate or partner with other extremists, weakened the US' will to attain its strategic goals.

### **Institutional Issues**

Numerous roadblocks inherent in the compartmentalized nature, culture, and dynamics of various US institutions are blamed for Washington's incapacity to conclude the long-running 20-year war in Afghanistan on terms that are acceptable to the US national interest. Military and diplomatic operations have been disjointed and often at probabilities. The (SIGAR) or Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction stated that security assistance operations were hampered by an absence of defined command-and-control relationships among the US armed forces and the US State Department (SIGAR, 2019). The absence of clear interagency leadership contributed significantly to the United States' inability to build the Afghan land as a stable and safe nation.

Civilian and military agencies in Washington created procedures to synchronize interagency stabilization programming, but agencies in Afghanistan did not work together. Because political, armed, and intelligence stovepipes impeded coherent planning, unification of activities across the many interagency initiatives was a difficulty. Military leaders in the United States struggled to connect their militia plans to those of the American State Department and USAID (Reveron, 2016). The US military decided priorities on the ground without sufficient advance cooperation due to its massive budget and size, forcing civilian agencies to execute their operations in locations that were not suitable for

stabilization initiatives (Sopko, 2018). Another example of how this lack of cooperation manifested itself occurred in 2009 approximately, when political and armed actions were at odds. During the President Obama's era, the diplomatic international policy branch launched peace talks with the Taliban leaders and reclassified them as non-enemies, while the military arm planned a surge to confront them on the battlefield. The US military had to scale back aggressive operations against the Taliban as a result of this diplomatic strategy. As offensive initiatives against the terrorist group dwindled, the Taliban acquired more land, increased internal assaults, increased large-scale assaults on the Afghani populace and security personnel, and increased attacks on US soldiers with the help of Pakistan's intelligence service (McMaster, 2020). The campaign also undermined the legitimacy of the Kabul government, increased the Taliban's ability to expand assaults on Kabul security personnel and the police, and destroyed faith between Americans and the Afghans.

Fast scaling, decreased staff deployment tours, and the need to achieve speedy results led in human and resource shortages, which hampered stabilization efforts. Many important US initiatives were understaffed, lacked suitably qualified employees, had high team turnover, or underutilized talented native workers. Consequently, these projects did not provide the expected results. Furthermore, stabilization initiatives with insufficient manpower failed to identify or disclose the needs for (Iyengar, Shapiro, & Higarty, 2017). A variety of inefficiencies and conflicting activities are said to have emerged from differences in civilian and military aims, timescales, and culture. When American armed end-strength was lowered, civilian security staff presence was also reduced, reflecting the militia's pullout plan, undermining supervision and the long-term viability of reconstruction and development initiatives.

Furthermore, various agencies within the US government had varying levels of objective and strategic risk management, leading decision makers to pursue ineffectual policies since the unidentified risks of withdrawal exceeded the existing costs of staying. Following the US pullout in 2011, the development of the Islamic State in Iraq made officials even more risk apprehensive in Afghanistan (Magsmen & Fuchs, 2019).

There may have been chances squandered at the start of the conflict that may have led to a triumphant conclusion. The Taliban attempted to broker a peace plan that illuminated disarming and recognizing Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan's chief, but the Washington Bush administration turned it down. By refusing to accept the proposal, an Afghan government was formed without the participation of major Taliban commanders who had indicated interest in participating in the solution. "Top Taliban commanders were open to giving the novel setup a try, but we didn't provide them an opportunity," according to the Washington Post. Khalilzad said that the Bush administration may have squandered an opportunity to stop the conflict soon after it began by refusing to negotiate to the Taliban.

### **Vulnerable intelligence Gathering and Sharing**

Lack of intelligence collecting and sharing impeded US foreign policy, resulting in inadequate insights into enemy motivation and operations, exacerbating other flaws in US international policy, and contributing to the extended conflict in Kabul. In Afghanistan, domestic and armed intelligence to enable efficient policy-making was originally scarce and ineffective (Sopko, 2018). Using a weakness in US information, terrorist militants resurrected and carried out devastating strikes on Afghan civilians and forces. Until over a decade into the conflict, the United States' capacity to understand the Taliban's motivations and intentions was hampered by a lack of timely and accurate intelligence (Donati & Stancati, 2015).

If the US had had enough actionable intelligence early on, it might have entertained diplomatic contacts with the Taliban far sooner. Due to a lack of knowledge, US policymakers wrongly assumed that the Taliban solely had military goals, whereas in fact they had political and social purposes as well. Information and intelligence gaps occurred from many alterations in US ambassadors to Kabul, commanders, armed forces, and their populace counterparts. Furthermore, access to critical information and intelligence was hampered as a result of American diplomats staying largely within American dorms to avoid casualties. This liability aversion attitude was considered by US military leaders as devastating in terms of information collection (Waldman, 2013).

### **An element of Domestic Politics in the US**

Domestic political motives have played a crucial role in the United States' policy blunders in Afghanistan across presidential election cycles. Officials in the United States have taken advantage of the deadlines for reevaluating Afghanistan policy, which will be influenced by the outcome of the US presidential election. For instance, President Barack Obama's plan to boost troop levels was impacted by the date of the presidential elections in the year 2012. If Obama had backed troop withdrawals, he would have seemed fragile and risked losing the election (Mandelbaum, 179). In the same manner, politicians seeking votes by prematurely declaring troop withdrawals harmed US strategy in Afghanistan by providing advance notice of American plans to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations (Waldman, 841).

### **The Limitations of Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

Owing to the "light footprint" strategy used in the early years of the conflict, the American counterterrorism policy in Kabul had minimal effectiveness due to being reactive to the danger of aggression, concentrating on short-term goals, missing a long-term anti-terror strategy, and giving inadequate resources to safeguard the nation. The United States lacked a proactive preventative plan to stem the propagation of aggressive terrorism, delay the creation of budding extremist factions, and strengthen the weak country's resistance to transnational jihadist threats. The United States' approach has not prioritized or focused on preventing terrorist groups from regenerating. When a result, as the United States attacked and fought hostile terrorist factions, other ones arose, aggression increased, and the war against terror grew. By balancing a remedial, reactive concentrations on fighting the extremism danger with a protracted goal of preventing terrorism, a proactive strategy would complement the counterterrorism approach.

### **Weak Determination and War knowledge**

After twenty years of conflict in Kabul without any end in sight, the determination of American leadership and the General populace to stay true to the operation has waned. Domestically, American officials made no sustained attempt to establish understanding and justification for the sacrifice of National lives and riches. As a consequence, people of America are perplexed about what the US should accomplish in Kabul, why such goals should be pursued, and what approaches would achieve the goal at a fair cost. As per a Pew Research Center poll, nearly half of soldiers feel fighting the war in Afghanistan is no longer justified, while 49 percent of the people believe that America has generally been unable to meet its goals in the nation. Furthermore, 61 percent of Afghans say their country is heading in the wrong path (Magesmen & Fuches). The former National Security Advisor Lt. General H.R. McMaster said that "The lack of commitment to maintain the fight in Afghanistan led to rationalization of the choice to withdraw and the revival of the errors and inconsistencies that weakened US strategy there nearly from the start," (McMaster, 216). The press broadly

recognized on the violence when people died, and they didn't provide background. Many Americans felt the afghan war was inconsequential as they were unaware of the fight or had little knowledge of the country. Americans are cautious of putting more money and death in Kabul because their prior investments have not delivered satisfactory outcomes (Mandelbaum,184).

### **Inability to Recognize the Enemy**

Uncertainty over who to rely on or who is a foe or a friend exacerbated US strategic failures. At the start of the conflict, American forces had no idea whether they were fighting the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or a variety of other islamist radicals. Additionally, authorities in the United States were confused if Pakistan was a friend or a threat. "I have no vision into who the evil people are," former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said. The Taliban were formerly thought to be "backward" and "mediaeval." They did, however, show to be skilled strategic planners, with effective leadership that was fast to tap intron their opponents' flaws and attain a massive intelligence connection (Dorronsororo,2009).

Furthermore, the United States' efforts to offer mediation between the militant faction and the Afghan authorities are based on the predisposition that if the Taliban and the Afghan government share power, the Taliban will become a benign organization and stop supporting Al-Qaeda and other jihadist terrorist organizations. Others, on the other hand, see the Taliban as an untrustworthy, brutal, vicious, sexist organization linked to the Al-Qaeda network and other islamist factions, with ties to Pakistani militia components. Essentially, the flown Osama Bin Laden was permitted to live and function out of Afghan soil by the Militants. The Taliban's standing as a friend or adversary is still up in the air. The United States' aim, according to the Obama administration, was to demolish and defeat Al-Qaeda. General Stanley McChrystal's draught strategy report, on the other hand, included no mention of Al-Qaeda, as if it wasn't any issue. Furthermore, many Afghanis whom the US first regarded as allies were ultimately revealed to be untrustworthy and corrupt warlords. Because it had no other options, the Karzai government nominated warlords to political posts across Afghan institutions. Insurgencies, widespread corruption, and a false administration were the outcome. The challenge of determining the difference between a friend and an adversary, who is to be trusted and who is not remains to this day. This holds true for Afghans as well.

### **Assumptions and Miscalculations**

Because of inaccurate assumptions, misjudgments, prejudices, and unsubstantiated inclinations, many defunct and unfounded US international policy actions have been undertaken, contributing to the extended Afghan conflict. To begin with, civilian and military authorities often default to a policy that prioritizes war operations above diplomacy, expecting that the situation would improve after the adversary is eliminated. Instant, strategic and functional victories would instill complacency in the military's competitiveness, leading to a reversion to the same short-term armed strategy that would eventually be unsuccessful to produce strategic and sustainable victory in the long run. These preferences have resulted in armed force increases, the gradual increment in Kabul security staff, and hence, the shaping of US strategy to depend mainly on military solutions.

Furthermore, the US miscalculated that spending more money on bridges, schools, canals, and other civilian tenders would result in speedier security gains in Afghanistan (Whitelock,2019). Due to the Afghan institutions' failure to absorb the money, greater economic aid resulted in increased corruption and fraud. Between 2009 and 2012, an increase in US military forces and subsequent combat actions resulted in an increase of

Taliban militants. The United States' inclination to cite "sunk cost" as rationale for continually reinforcing and implementing policies based on incorrect assumptions has prevented America from undertaking the required plan changes to accomplish its long-term objective goals.

Moreover, many policymakers and the Americans mistakenly believe that the US occupation of Afghanistan is met with resistance from both Afghans and the Taliban, prolonging the conflict. The Taliban, who are now considered a US ally, are the only ones who oppose the US occupation in Afghanistan. The Afghan government and the majority of its people want the United States and its coalition allies to stay and promote the creation of a self-sufficient government capable of protecting Afghans from terrorist organizations' brutality (Constable,2019).

Reaching a cease-fire with the Militants, who supported Al-Qaeda in the heinous murder of hundreds of People in the united states on 9/11/2001, and have ruthlessly tormented and massacred countless innocent Afghans, would only prolong the fight. Other US authorities believe that US strategy assumes that the Militants cannot be recognized as a peace collaborator in discussions, that they are unreliable and tied to Al-Qaeda and other extremist rebel factions.

The notion that the Taliban would engage with the Kabul administration in good faith and put a stop to their violence and cruelty against Afghan residents has already proven false, as violence and assaults on Afghans have increased. Furthermore, based on US diplomatic requests and economic aid, US strategy erroneously anticipates that Pakistan would discontinue its encouragement for the Taliban and other cross border extremist factions. Pakistan's funding for Islamist extremist organizations will not be reduced or ended. It employs these organizations as its international policy extension, developing strategic depth in places like Kabul to further its national goals (McMaster,2020,8)These are only main instances of faulty predispositions which contribute to poor judgments and policy debacles in the US. (Muzaffar, et. al. 2019)

To summarize, the United States' Foreign Policy Failures in Afghanistan were caused by underlying US hurdles such as faulty suppositions, weak information sharing, organizational shortcomings, a complete absence of national communications plan, encouraging national willpower, and a lack of knowledge about who the adversary was/is.

## **Conclusion**

At the outset of the armed dominance over the militants, US policymakers, civilians, and armed troops were unable to evaluate the need of a stable Kabul administration, and hence were unsuccessful to direct the critical work needed to attain acceptable financial and political outcomes. During important early years of the fight, the US grand plan in Afghanistan was under-resourced. While the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were rebuilding and strengthening their positions, the United States was preoccupied with the Iraq war, which consumed the majority of its attention and resources. Because the US was reacting to the horrific psychological extremist assaults of September 11, the US policy to attack Afghanistan was justifiable. Prior to this, the US had little chance to use diplomacy or create partnerships in the region. Nonetheless, the lessons learned from the US strategy's flaws in the Afghan conflict will be useful in a variety of missions over the next two decades. In summary, competing aims and approaches, uneven efforts, impeded coalitions, Pakistan's poisonous effect, and explicit obstacles between the United States and Kabul all added to the amount of impediments the United States experienced in achieving its wartime and postwar state-building objectives.



## **Recommendations**

USA may continue to safeguard and defend its national interests across the world, and use its military when intended to safeguard and defend its country and the People of America. The United States should never abandon its goals of expanding democracy, bolstering human rights, and promoting free market capitalism. However, in order to achieve our foreign policy goals, the US must engage in successful diplomacy, use moderate financial aid, deploy the US military when needed as part of a comprehensive and coherent plan, and guarantee that the military and civilian lines of effort are well-coordinated. Rather than using the US force as a last option, US foreign policy should identify the correct military component of the danger and customize the armed dimension of the response within the framework of a more coordinated and integrative strategy that employs all of national power's capabilities. When the US military is utilized, it should be done in a fashion that ensures a high likelihood of success, in conformity with the law of military confrontation, and as part of a comprehensive political and military strategy. Based on America's existing resource constraints, developing global dangers, and rising difficulties both within and without its borders, US foreign policy must acknowledge America's boundaries with humility. Terrorist groups continue to pose a persistent danger to US national interests as US foreign policy changes to meet the Great Power Competition. Because the United States is not involved in staging counter-terrorism wars, there is a greater risk that they may escalate quickly and constitute a costly danger to US interests. While the United States should not get involved in every dispute throughout the globe, it must review the repercussions of its inactivity on the country's basic principles and interests on a regular basis. The United States should accept its inability to completely eradicate terrorism with humility. In particular, US policy must strike a balance between "ends, ways, and means;" establish clear and attainable specific goals; embrace effective, useful, and resource-sustainable schemes; ensure synchronization of military and diplomatic actions; develop partnerships to share the burden of counterterrorism; and leverage cooperative frameworks and geographic partnerships to increase regional states' capacity and willingness to safeguard their autonomy and contribute to multinational c In the future decades, a reformed foreign policy should include a comprehensive, integrated, and coordinated approach including defense, diplomacy, economics, and humanitarian relief lines of effort.

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