Abstract
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This study aims to explore why the US' post-Cold War global policy has largely been unsuccessful to fulfil American goals when it comes to regional extremist fights. Using Afghanistan as a case study, this study evaluates the various US government and administration's contradictions, inconsistencies, loop holes, and grand strategy frameworks that have trapped the nation in lengthy counter-terrorism battles and hampered the nation's prospects of finishing the hostilities effectively in the previous two decades. Soon after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the US' Grand strategy emphasis shifted to combatting as well as eradicating terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and the African continent. The US/Afghan war is a governmental issue of exceptional power, in which the Afghan rebel structure influences the conflictual behavior, and the US as a tremendous power exploits September 11. Finally, this study will propose policy propositions to help the US make effective policies regarding where and with what rationale to spend tax money, risking the lives of Americans, and improve the country's strategic competency regarding future dynamic confrontations particularly against autocratic regimes and transnational jihadist activities. |
Keywords
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Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, Grand Strategy, United States |
Article
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Article # 80
Volume # 2
Issue # 4
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DOI info
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DOI Number: 10.47205/jdss.2021(2-IV)80
DOI Link: http://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2021(2-IV)80
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